Orgelstueck 'Maestoso' Opus 11 nr. At the age of 7 was already serving as organist of the Vaduz parish church, and his first composition was performed the following year. In , he entered the Munich Conservatorium, where he later became professor of piano and composition. The stylistic influences on Rheinberger ranged from contemporaries such as Brahms to composers from earlier times, such as Mendelssohn, Schumann, Schubert and, above all, Bach.
He was also an enthusiast for painting and literature especially English and German. In he was appointed court conductor, responsible for the music in the royal chapel. He was later awarded an honorary doctorate by Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. A distinguished teacher, he numbered many Americans among his pupils. When the second Munich Conservatorium was founded, Rheinberger was appointed Royal Professor of organ and composition, a post he held for the rest of his life.
He was a prolific composer, but today he is remembered primarily for his elaborate and challenging organ compositions; these include two concertos, 20 sonatas in 20 different keys of a projected set of 24 sonatas in all the keys , 22 trios, and 36 solo pieces. His organ sonatas were once declared to be: "undoubtedly the most valuable addition to organ music since the time of Mendelssohn. They are characterized by a happy blending of the modern Romantic spirit with masterly counterpoint and dignified organ style.
His grave was destroyed during World War II, and his remains were moved to his home town of Vaduz in The score is attached below, and will find these pieces on the opening pages. Rather, the topical arguer produces arguments of differing strength, depending on how close to being a logical truth is the maximal sentence associated with the differentia he is using. So, for example, the following syllogism is hypothetical:.
This conclusion is true to the extent that the tradition Boethius inherited goes back in part to Stoic roots. By the time it had reached Boethius, however, Stoic and Peripatetic elements had become hopelessly confused. Martin has shown, Boethius himself lacked the conceptual apparatus to think in terms of sentence logic. The three opuscula sacra written to analyse points of Christian doctrine seem to have been occasioned by events of the time. Treatise V, against Eutyches and Nestorius, was apparently inspired by a letter c. The two treatises on the Trinity II is a partial sketch for I are probably related to the intervention in by a group of Scythian monks, also designed to heal the schism.
The works have, however, an interest far beyond their contributions to the immediate doctrinal debate. They pioneer a method of using logical analysis in a theological context which Augustine had anticipated but not developed. Both heretical positions for examples, the views about Christ and human nature held by Eutyches and Nestorius and orthodox Christian doctrine are subjected to rigorous scrutiny, using the techniques of Aristotelian logic and, where necessary, ideas from Aristotelian physics.
The heretical ideas are shown to contain logical contradictions. As for the orthodox understanding of God, it does not fit within the classifications of Aristotelian logic and natural science, but Boethius tries to chart exactly how far these distinctions, which are accommodated to the created world, also apply to the deity, and at what point they break down and provide us merely with an analogy. This way of thinking about God is made especially clear in the longer treatise on the Trinity I.
When God is said to have an attribute, how is this predication to be understood? Augustine had already acknowledged that nothing is predicated of God accidentally. Even when a quality or quantity is attributed to him, the predication is substantial. When we say of a created thing that it is great or good, we are affirming that it participates in greatness or goodness: it is one thing for the thing to exist, another for it to be great or good.
This Augustinian view is faithfully set out in the brief Treatise II. In Treatise I, Boethius develops this scheme.
Easiest Liszt Pieces: Categories
In especial, he distinguishes between predications in the categories of Substance, Quantity and Quality, which are proper and intrinsic, and those in the other six categories, excluding Relation, which he calls improper and extrinsic. The intuitive idea behind the distinction seems to be that predications in these other categories concern only how the subject relates to other things; only substantial, quantitative and qualitative attributes characterize the thing itself.
Boethius goes on to say that, whereas all proper, intrinsic predications about God are substantial, extrinsic, improper predications about him are not: they do not concern what either God or his creatures are, but are rather about exterior things. The discussion of Relation shows particularly clearly how Boethius applies logic to analysing God as far as he can, and then shows where and how the logic fails.
He needs to explain how it can be true that the same, one God is both the Father and the Son. Moreover, there are some relationships which a thing can have to itself—for example, that of equality. Being-a-father and being-a-son are not, among created things, such relations: no one can be his own father or his own son.
But it is here, says Boethius, that creaturely logic breaks down when it tries to comprehend the Trinity: we have in some way to try to grasp the idea of a relation of fatherhood or filiation which is reflexive. Another philosophical question Boethius explores in his discussions of the Trinity is individuation as well as more widely the topic of parts and wholes. Unfortunately, it is not completely clear to what theory of individuation he subscribes. A quick reading of some passages would suggest that substances are indviduated by a bundle of accidents, but there are indications that Boethius may have preferred a theory of individuation by spatio-temporal position, or one different from either of these cf.
Arlig, Treatise III is also concerned with predication and God. But it differs sharply from the other treatises, in that it contains nothing specifically Christian.
The question it addresses is how all substances are good in that they are, and yet are not substantial goods. Boethius takes it as a fundamental truth that all things tend to the good, and also that things are by nature like what they desire.follow
Consolation - 6 Pieces For Piano | Hal Leonard Online
Everything, therefore, is by nature good. If they were merely good by participation, they would be good by accident, not by nature. But if they are good substantially, then their substance is goodness itself, and so nothing can be distinguished from the first good, God. In giving his answer, Boethius makes use of a set of axioms he states at the beginning of the piece, and undertakes a thought-experiment in which it is supposed per impossibile that God does not exist. The key to his solution lies in finding a principled way to distinguish between a thing a being F in that it exists, and a thing a being substantially F.
Whereas it is inconceivable that God is not good, it is merely impossible that everything is not good. The Consolation of Philosophy presents interpretative difficulties of a different order from the logical works or the theological treatises. Unlike them, it is written in an elaborate literary form: it consists of a dialogue between Boethius, sitting in his prison-cell awaiting execution, and a lady who personifies Philosophy, and its often highly rhetorical prose is interspersed with verse passages.
Moreover, although it is true that elsewhere Boethius does not write in a way which identifies him as a Christian except in the Theological Treatises I, II, IV and V, the absence of any explicit reference to Christianity in the Consolation poses a special problem, when it is recalled that it is the work of a man about to face death and so very literally composing his philosophical and literary testament. These questions will appear in sharper focus Section 7 when the argument of the Consolation has been examined. He represents himself as utterly confused and dejected by his sudden change of fortune.
She also identifies in Book I a wider objective: to show that it is not the case, as Boethius the character claims, that the wicked prosper and the good are oppressed. Philosophy seems to have two different lines of argument to show Boethius that his predicament does not exclude him from true happiness. The first train of argument rests on a complex view of the highest good.
The first which is put forward in Book II and the first part of Book III distinguishes between the ornamental goods of fortune, which are of very limited value—riches, status, power and sensual pleasure—and the true goods: the virtues and also sufficiency, which is what those who seek riches, status and power really desire. On the basis of these distinctions, Philosophy can argue that Boethius has not lost any true goods, and that he still even retains those goods of fortune—his family—which carry much real worth.
She does not maintain that, in his fall from being powerful, rich and respected to the status of a condemned prisoner, Boethius has lost nothing of any worth at all. But his loss need not cut him off from true happiness, which is attained primarily by an austere life based on sufficiency, virtue and wisdom. She begins to put it forward in III. Through a number of arguments which draw out the consequences of the Neoplatonic assumptions which Boethius accepts, Philosophy shows that the perfect good and perfect happiness are not merely in God: they are God.
Perfect happiness is therefore completely untouched by changes in earthly fortune, however drastic. But what this second approach fails to explain is how the individual human, such as Boethius, is supposed to relate to the perfect happiness which is God. Philosophy seems to speak as if, merely by knowing that God is perfect happiness, Boethius himself will be rendered happy, although in the next section it seems that it is by acting well that a person can attain the good. Philosophy now goes on III. He does so by acting as a final cause.
But how does this account fit with the apparent oppression of the good and triumph of the wicked, about which Boethius had begun by complaining? In Book IV.
Her central argument is that what everyone wants is happiness, and happiness is identical with the good. The good have therefore gained happiness, whereas the wicked have not; and since people have power in so far as they can gain or bring about what they want, the wicked are powerless. She also argues that the good gain their reward automatically, since by being good, they attain the good, which is happiness.
By contrast, since evil is not a thing but a privation of existence, by being wicked people punish themselves, because they cease even to exist—that is to say, they stop being the sort of things they were, humans, and become other, lower animals. Philosophy is therefore able to put forward emphatically two of the most counter-intuitive claims of the Gorgias : that the wicked are happier when they are prevented from their evil and punished for it, than when they carry it out with impunity, and that those who do injustice are unhappier than those who suffer it.
At the beginning of IV. Unlike many modern philosophers, Boethius did not believe that the will can remain free, in the sense needed for attribution of moral responsibility, if it is determined causally. Moreover, Philosophy insists that the causal chain of providence, as worked out in fate, embraces all that happens. It is reduced and lost as humans give their attentions to worldly things and allow themselves to be swayed by the passions.
- Site Information Navigation.
- Jonathan Strong, Consolation | Porter Square Books.
- Live In Pieces.
- Consolation Pieces by Adam M Pope | .
He argues that:. Since it is accepted that God is omniscient, and that this implies that he knows what every future event—including mental events such as volitions—will be, 7 and 8 each seem to rule out any sort of freedom of the will requisite for attributing moral responsibility: a consequence the disastrous implications of which Boethius the character vividly describes. The following is, rather, an attempt to present the discussion as it actually proceeds in the Consolation.
The first point which needs to be settled is what, precisely, is the problem which Boethius the character proposes? One way of reading this discussion is that the argument here is in fact fallacious. According to this interpretation, the reasoning behind 7 seems to be of the following form:. The pattern behind 8 will be similar, but in reverse: from a negation of 13 , the negation of 9 will be seen to follow. But, as it is easy to observe, 9—13 is a fallacious argument: 10 and 11 imply, not 12 , but.
The fallacy in question concerns the scope of the necessity operator. Boethius the character is clearly taken in by this fallacious argument, and there is no good reason to think that Boethius the author ever became aware of the fallacy despite a passage later on which some modern commentators have interpreted in this sense. None the less, the discussion which follows does not, as the danger seems to be, address itself to a non-problem.
Although his logical formulation does not capture this problem, the solution Boethius gives to Philosophy is clearly designed to tackle it.